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Abstract In the current economy roughly 90% of all world trade is trans-
ported by the shipping industry, which is now accelerating its technological
growth. While the demand on mariners, ship owners, and the encompassing
maritime community for digital advances (particularly towards digitization
and automation) has led to efficient shipping operations, maritime cyber-
security is a pertinent issue of equal importance. As hackers are becoming
increasingly aware of cyber-vulnerabilities within the maritime sector, and as
existing risk assessment tools do not adequately represent the unique nature of
maritime cyber-threats, this article introduces a model-based risk assessment
framework which considers a combination of cyber and maritime factors. Con-
fronted with a range of ship functionalities, configurations, users, and envi-
ronmental factors, this framework aims to comprehensively present maritime
cyber-risks and better inform those in the maritime community when making
cyber-security decisions. By providing the needed maritime-cyber risk profiles,
it becomes possible to support a range of parties, such as operators, regulators,
insurers, and mariners, in increasing overall global maritime cyber-security.
Keywords Maritime · Cyber-security · Risk Assessment · Cyber-threats
1 Introduction
Despite the growing number of environmental and economic challenges facing
international shipping, the vast majority of global trade, in value and vol-
ume, is conducted on the ocean (International Chamber of Shipping 2016a,
b). While a significant percentage of the global fleet is devoted to the shipping
industry and consists of container vessels, bulk carriers, and tankers, there is
still a wide variety of ships designed for pleasure, specialized cargo, military,
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scientific exploration, and other services (e.g., ice breakers). Due to the signif-
icant number of diverse factors involved (e.g., ship type, cargo, route, crew),
technologies have been internationally standardized to provide safe and reli-
able navigation, communication, cargo management, propulsion, and ship-wide
monitoring. Standards for these are defined by the International Convention
for Safety of Life at Sea (International Maritime Organization (1974)), and are
constantly revised as circumstances change (e.g., environmental concerns) and
new technology arises. These systems are a novel combination of on-shore and
maritime technology, and interconnected in a unique, mobile context, creating
interesting cyber-risk scenarios unlike those traditionally seen on-shore.
While increased interconnectivity between ships, personal devices, and on-
shore infrastructure has improved operational efficiency and physical safety, it
also enables an increase of cyber-attacks, as demonstrated in Allianz Global
Corporate and Specialty SE (2016); Jones et al (2016); Maersk (2017) and
USMRC Maritime Cyber Assurance Research (2016). While physical secu-
rity and accident statistics are well understood in the maritime sector, cyber-
security is unlike both of these. Normally, a system is considered functioning,
or broken. However, with cyber-attacks, a non-functioning system may not
be broken (e.g., a hacker can deny system access), and a functioning system
may not be trustworthy (e.g., compromised systems can give false data de-
spite seemingly functional). Furthermore, an accident is considered high risk
if it is likely to happen, whilst a cyber-attack’s risk is based on how easily an
adversary can make it happen. Therefore a vulnerability that may be low risk
for an accident may have high risk as a potential cyber-attack.
To assess cyber-threats facing ships, crews, and the environment, this paper
presents a tool to comprehensively quantify and display maritime cyber-risks.
Specifically, in order to be a useful tool for human maritime-cyber awareness
and decision making, this framework aims to provide the following:
1. Accurate characterization of maritime-cyber risks and their severity;
2. Scalable measurements from single systems or ships to fleets;
3. Identify systems that would most benefit, or need, additional security;
4. Identify top risk outcomes, attackers, attack-vectors;
5. Provide risk data in useful views to support human decisions.
To accomplish the above, this paper proposes the novel modeling frame-
work MaCRA (Maritime Cyber-Risk Assessment) and demonstrates how it com-
prehensively assesses and conveys risks. For demonstrating plausibility, inten-
tional cyber-attacks are extrapolated from past accidents that occurred due to
similar system vulnerabilities. This has significance, as it has been difficult to
obtain general statistics on all cyber-related maritime incidents as many of the
small-scale attacks currently go unnoticed (e.g., lesser data theft) and some of
the more significant attacks have not been released publicly to prevent loss of
customers, as mentioned in Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty SE (2016)
and Cassidy (2017). It is also likely that the lack of adequate cyber-awareness
often results in the misclassification of cyber-attacks as human or machine
error (Rothblum (2000); Wingrove (2016)).
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While the majority of maritime cyber-crimes lack the sophistication and
magnitude of on-shore attacks, continuing trends of powerful, networked sys-
tems in a lucrative global market demands a proactive approach toward mar-
itime cyber-risks. Moreover, based on the global fleet’s development, under-
standing the threats against today’s most technologically advanced ships may
better protect emergent classes of vessels (e.g., autonomous ships, as seen in
Rolls Royce (2017)). While technology changes also increase the number of
accidents, see Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty SE (2016), that is not
the focus of this article. Instead, this paper examines the maritime risks of
intentional cyber-attacks by using a model-based approach that can assess
cyber-risks in multiple contexts. The rest of this article is as follows. Section
2 provides an overview of the MaCRA framework and how it models maritime
cyber-risk variables using attacker and target attributes. Section 3 examines
popular ship system technology and analyses them from a cyber perspective
for both known and potential cyber-vulnerabilities. Section 4 populates the
proposed MaCRA model with Section 3 data and exhibits several use-case sce-
narios and assessments. Section 5 compares MaCRA to related works, both in
maritime-cyber security and the risk assessment sector, to demonstrate it’s
unique abilities. And lastly, Sections 6 and 7 conclude with possible research
paths for future work and how it can benefit the extensive maritime sector.
2 MaCRA Threat Assessment Framework
Depending on what a person is assessing, different subsets of the underlying
data can be extracted from MaCRA to create intuitive views. This is impor-
tant as individuals and organizations will be interested in different aspects of
cyber-security. For example, captains, crew, and insurers may all be interested
in different aspects of cyber-risk and can view the same risk data in ways
that best assist the decisions they make. More specifically, to make the re-
sults comprehensible for a wide audience, MaCRA is capable of reducing model
complexity by projecting risk-assessment views focusing on specific ships, at-
tackers, outcomes, etc. This is a powerful capability for analyzing risk, based
not just on one physical ship, but its function and environment, as demon-
strated further in the following sections1. To this end, MaCRA assessments can
increase general cyber-risk knowledge and help the maritime community in
strategically reducing risks against both known and potential threats.
Based on the well established pattern of general risk and threat assessment
models, (e.g., Borgovini et al (1993); Peltier (2005); United States General
Accounting Office (1999)), this article attempts to gain a better understanding
of ship cyber-risks by evaluating threats on three main criteria: (1) System
vulnerability and effect (2) ease-of-exploit, later referred to as EoE or “ease”,
and (3) reward. MaCRA labels these as axiss, axise, and axisr respectively.
1 All tables and figures were created by the authors to illustrate framework abilities.
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2.1 Vulnerability Characteristics
Axiss of the MaCRA framework enumerates a set of system vulnerabilities to
be modeled and their possible negative impacts (e.g., GPS spoofing : ship
misdirection). This provided an interesting perspective as several systems
examined may not be important for maritime operations, but could hold sig-
nificant cyber-vulnerabilities, and it was also clear that maritime systems are
not comparative to those in other sectors and should be further analyzed.
Figure 1 (b) labels this axis as “vulnerability”, as a system can have several.
While generating a complete set of all technological vulnerabilities and
their effects for the entire global fleet is outside the scope of this paper, and as
no set already exists, this article gathered sufficient real-world data in Section 3
to showcase the proposed MaCRA framework. Although axiss is primarily based
on a ship’s on-board technology, it is important to note that environmental
factors (e.g., geographic location, weather, crew) are significant variables that
are also considered. For example, crew members can be blackmailed or targeted
by email phishing attack vectors, as seen in BIMCO et al (2016), and some
physical locations provide unique opportunities for attacks like piracy, making
MaCRA applicable to complex socio-technical scenarios like insider threats and
sensitive to global factors like crime, politics, and economics.
The need for accurate cyber-risks assessments is becoming more critical to
ensure economic and physical safety as maritime systems grow more techno-
logically dependent and advanced. With the advent of satellite positioning, key
systems such as navigation are becoming more and more centralized on a ship,
creating an Integrated Bridge System (IBS). The IBS enables easier control
and monitoring functions by providing an information-rich area with increas-
ingly fine-grained controls. However, a center of sophistical, interconnected
systems with a wealth of information and controls is a likely target for cyber
attackers. Typical ship systems can be divided by functionality; navigation,
control, communication, machinery and cargo management, crew welfare, and
specialized, as similarly shown in BIMCO et al (2016). The IBS also often pro-
vides an Internet gateway, allowing access to external systems and potentially
malicious entities. Section 3 explores these ship system categories further.
2.2 Ease-of-Exploit (EoE)
Semantic, environmental factors play a much more central role in modeling
axise when determining EoE, i.e. how easy a system can be attacked using
cyber. For example, the experience and awareness of the crew and passengers
could deter or allow a cyber-attack, as seen in CyberKeel (2014a). Moreover,
it is also likely that a ship’s configuration (e.g., firewalls) and physical location
could determine the likelihood of an attack. For example, close proximity to
shipping casualty or piracy hotspots would imply attack advantages at those
coordinates. As another example, if data theft is the attacker’s goal, certain
ports and networks with weak anti-virus would increase EoE.
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Table 1 Ease-of-Exploit (EoE) with respect to hacker abilities and resources within MaCRA.
Tier Human-based Resources Technological Resources
T ier5:
Script
Kiddy
Little to no skills, often uses existing exploits
and tools. Attacks are non-adaptive if it fails.
Often leaves forensic evidence and is detectable
because of simplicity.
Knows what low-level
tools are available, how
to obtain, and known
vulnerabilities.
T ier4:
Basic
Attack
Some preparation (e.g., time) needed to tar-
get a single vulnerability with little to no pro-
tection. Often leaves forensic evidence and is
detectable because of simplicity.
Able to trade for better
attacks or has resources
to create/alter known at-
tacks.
T ier3:
Profes-
sional
Preparation (e.g., time) needed to target a
single vulnerability with has basic protection.
May leave forensic evidence. May create ”fam-
ilies” of similar attacks and known patterns.
Has solid knowledge
and/or external as-
sistance for generat-
ing/testing attack.
T ier2:
Corpo-
rate
One or more advanced systems affected, de-
spite target defenses. May not leave forensic
evidence, some aspects difficult to detect. Re-
quires significant preparation (e.g. time).
Resources for under-
standing/nullifying
some defenses + T ier3
knowledge.
T ier1:
Nation
State
Advanced Persistent Threats (APT), one or
more systems targeted at once to achieve goals.
Target is well protected with strategic, effec-
tive defenses. May not leave forensic evidence,
most aspects difficult to detect, and requires
significant resources/planning.
Resources include ad-
vanced tools, self-made
or outsourced, tools to
obfuscate attack and by-
pass defenses.
Unlike axiss, which focuses on modeling the ship systems, axise and axisr
determine how likely an attacker is to exploit a cyber-vulnerability to trigger
an outcome. The EoE or “ease” axis is used to model the level of resources
a hacker must expend, relative to their capability, to successfully perform an
attack. Modeling this data in MaCRA, the EoE of a system is determined by the
difficulty level of attacking its vulnerability. To this end, MaCRA uses a five-tier
system based on equivalences in conventional computing systems to represent
the level of “hacking ability” and available resources required for the desired
exploit (see Table 1). The tiers descend in number, as MaCRA plots the EoE. For
example, if the GPS on a ship is vulnerable to both jamming and spoofing,
and the latter is more complex with a higher “cost” for the attacker, MaCRA
may assign it an EoE score of tier3 or tier4, depending on the ship defenses.
In contrast, jamming can be achieved with little to no understanding of the
technology involved, and so has a higher EoE score of tier5.
Table 1 primarily considers the EoE of intentional attacks, however they
may also equate to accidental or unintentional impacts, such as leaking sen-
sitive information without fully comprehending the results. When discussing
attacker profiles (e.g., activists) this aspect will be taken into account, as one
cyber-attack could open back doors or leak information that may not initially
seem important. While MaCRA is able to determine risks of intentional attacks
to achieve known goals, it may not be as accurate, and therefore effective,
for accidental outcomes (see Section 5). Although a limitation in this case,
such a risk may updated afterwards by mapping the same EoE factor with an
increased attack reward value, or visa versa, to improve the model data.
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2.3 Cyber-Attack Reward
Axisr of the MaCRA framework models the end-reward value, as seen from the
attacker’s perspective. This modeling of hacker incentives determines whether
the outcome of an attack is desirable enough to invest the necessary resources.
This further differentiates accidents from intentional cyber-crime. To fully un-
derstand this aspect of the cyber-attacker psyche, MaCRA must correctly model
the types of hackers and their motivations. The following closely mirrors tradi-
tional cyber-attacker profiles within existing standard security landscape seen
in BIMCO et al (2016) and Fitch (2004).
Activists: Also known as “hacktivists”, the desired outcome of activist
groups is to achieve ideological goals. This often results in attacks designed to
disrupt activities or gain, and publicize, information to alter the behavior of
their targets. While nominally non-aggressive, their activities may create op-
portunities that benefit other attackers or cause accidental damage or leaks.
In the maritime context, activists typically want to make environmental, hu-
manitarian, or political-centered impacts.
Competitors: Competing companies, or even opposing nations, may seek
to increase their own market influence in the global economy through cyber-
crime. In most non-extreme cases the desired goal is to acquire information,
such as the opponent’s current bids, shipping manifests, and customers, to be
utilized in corporate settings. However, there is also incentive for disrupting a
competitor’s ship operations to damage financial status or reputation.
Criminals: These attackers range from individuals to groups of varying
size and sophistication. The vast majority of criminals desire profit in one
form or another including physical and intellectual theft, fraud, smuggling,
blackmail, and extortion. At one end of the spectrum, simple cyber-attacks
may be used to increase the effectiveness of typical physical crimes (e.g., piracy
as seen in MarEx (2016)), while at the other end there is the increase in
organized-crime developing and selling cyber-tools to all types of attackers
(i.e., indirect profit), as shown in European Cybercrime center (2014). Lastly,
this article considers pranksters as a subset of, mostly low-level, criminals
although they may be more “mischief” driven than criminally profit-driven.
Terrorists: While the previous cyber-attackers may occasionally cross a
line or cause unintentional, unnecessary deaths or damage, terrorists using
cyber or cyber-physical attacks often actively seek this result. In addition,
this attacker type may desire to increase their member count and resources,
which may result in theft, the spread of propaganda, and blackmail using
cyber-tools. In a more sophisticated attack, the ships themselves may become
an asset for long distant cyber or physical attacks.
Elitist: In a small niche of today’s hacking community, elitists traditionally
hacked systems to test, or show-off, their knowledge. Regardless of the decline
in such non-profit hackers, this article excludes elitists from the MaCRA model
because elitist attacks rarely exhibit negative outcomes, as stated in Fitch
(2004). However, one could analyze the risks of elitists hackers accidentally
causing harm, as they have the capacity for sophisticated cyber-attacks.
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Table 2 Levels of cyber-attack rewards as seen by attacker within MaCRA framework.
Tier 1 Little to no value: Target outcome can be accomplished with little or no
exploit effort and results are minimal both to the attacker(s) and to 3rd
parties (e.g., black market).
Tier 2 Small value: Low level attacker (i.e., tier1−2), small impact in quantity and
scale, ( i.e., secondary effect of main attack).
Tier 3 Average value: Outcome is primarily valuable to attacker(s), not a 3rd party,
and may fulfill the attacker’s goal.
Tier 4 Valuable: Core goal of attack is achieved. Side effects may happen (i.e., leak)
which other attackers value as low level.
Tier 5 Extremely valuable: The outcomes are highly desired by the attacker(s) and
other 3rd parties, with tier3−5 rewards.
To assess the reward of a cyber-attack, MaCRA models valuable outcomes
based on a five-tier reward value system (see Table 2) either as a static value
(i.e., one tier) or a range of tier values. The flexibility of value ranges is use-
ful as, for instance, different attackers and secondary effects may be modeled
simultaneously. Consider a ship’s activity log stored on a vulnerable on-ship
computer. An attacker could gain access to the data, although it has little
value, and then use the compromised system to target, and attack, other sys-
tems which can be more rewarding to say, an activist or competitor. In the
MaCRA framework, this is modeled by a range of values as the secondary effect
could increase the possible reward value of the initial attack. Similarly, mod-
eling specific attacker groups (e.g. terrorist factions) or individuals may shift
the range of reward upwards or downwards, depending on their characteristics.
This is demonstrated fully later in Section 4.
2.4 Framework Overview
As the three axes of the MaCRA model have been clearly established, this section
provides an overview of the framework. Although MaCRA can be viewed as three
dimensional matrix, in actuality it has a much higher dimensionality as all
three axes are functions of multiple variables, such as attacker, vulnerability,
and mitigation defenses. Specifically, this article considers an attacker and a
target to have the following attributes when considering maritime cyber-risks:
attackera = (avector, agoal, atype, aresources) (1)
targett = (tvulnerabilities, teffects, ttype, tresources) (2)
Where avector represents the attack-vector (e.g., vulnerable web applica-
tion), agoal is the attacker’s desired result (e.g., stolen information, physical
collision), atype represents the attacker profile as shown in Section 2.3, and
aresources represents an attacker’s access to skill, time, money, members, etc.
For the target, tvulnerabilities represents the set of weaknesses (e.g., outdated
operating system (OS) or firewall), teffects represents the possible impacts
if the vulnerability is exploited (e.g., loss of navigation), ttype is the target’s
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Fig. 1 Projection of MaCRA risk quadrants for to assess the frisk() of maritime systems.
type (e.g., river ferry) and tresources represent experienced crew, anti-virus,
and other factors that can be used for stopping or catching the attacker.
The attributes of both attacker and target are directly related to each
other, as an attack vector is directly related to a target’s vulnerabilities, and
an effect can only be desirable if the target is capable of producing that ef-
fect. Furthermore, the types (e.g., tanker, activist) and resources (e.g., insider
threat, alert crew, time) of both attacker and target must be considered to-
gether to accurately assess risk levels. How MaCRA models these attributes can
be seen below, where the attacker can be of any hacker type and the target can
be any maritime system, ship, or fleet. More specifically, attributes from Equa-
tions (1) and (2) describing attackera and targett are central to the following
equations for axiss, axise, and axisr:
axiss = fvulnerability(avector, tvulnerabilities, teffects) (3)
axise = fease(atype, ttype, aresources, tresources) (4)
axisr = freward(atype, ttype, agoal, teffects) (5)
From equations (3) - (5) MaCRA uses frisk(attacker, target) = I(fv(a, t), fe(a, t),
fr(a, t)) to plot various graphs and assess both general and specific cyber risks
given interesting maritime-cyber scenarios. Hence, each individual system vul-
nerability may be projected onto a plane like in Figure 1 (a) using attacker
reward and ease (EoE). A series of these representational graphs, where each
system is projected onto a 2D risk quadrant, would allow an assessor to com-
pare the risks of various systems at face value, but also in specific scenarios
with a range of factors for consideration. While risk can be evaluated by the
data point’s distance from the origin (i.e., risk indicator function I()), it can
also be generalized by the risk quadrant a vulnerability is mapped to.
In Figure 1, the top right quadrant defines the highest risks, as systems
projected there have the most reward for the least attacker effort. If an analyst
possesses limited resources for threat mitigation, filters Feffort and Freward
may be introduced to filter out risks related to low-reward or unrealistically
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Fig. 2 Integrated Bridge System (IBS), grouped roughly by function (e.g., navigation).
high-effort attacks. These could then define acceptable risks and focus security
efforts for optimal investment, as cyber defenses can be time and resource
consuming. Section 4 exploring these MaCRA projections further.
3 System Vulnerability Evaluation
This section evaluates popular ship systems with a cyber perspective, many
of which are mandated and regulated by existing governing bodies (e.g., IMO
Navigation (2017), Archives and Administration (2016)). While not a complete
set of the global fleet’s systems, as that data does not yet exist (see Section 6),
regulations do make the technologies in this section, many of which are unique
to the maritime sector, a reliable representational set of realistic modeling data
to populate MaCRA with. This is demonstrated in several use-case assessments
in Section 4. The following subsections categorize systems into navigation, po-
sitioning, communication, and physical asset (i.e., cargo) management. Lastly,
it examines the human factor and a few specialized systems. Each category is
concluded with a breakdown of the covered systems belonging to that cate-
gory, with an overall summary of cyber-vulnerabilities and impacts shown in
Table 3 and a connected view of systems in Figure 2.
3.1 Navigation Systems
As navigation is a core function of all ships, and due to International Maritime
Organization (2009a) mandating electronic charts (i.e. e-charts), navigational
system technologies are some of the most significant in the maritime sector
and its cyber-vulnerabilities would be of interest to any of the modeled attack-
ers. Thus it is important to consider the effects of plausible cyber-attacks and
whether the attacker’s aim is to misguide, confuse, deter, or damage. Figure
3 maps these systems to more specific technologies and possible cyber-attack
effects in a simplistic projection of MaCRA axiss data. For example, the pro-
jected view in Figure 3 shows that AIS holds the most cyber-vulnerabilities
and may be used to trigger the most effects, with damage seemingly the most
likely impact. This is related to how navigational systems are relied on, and
compromised directions may result in collisions.
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Fig. 3 Mapping of effects and technology of navigation systems within MaCRA.
Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) was mandated by
the IMO safety committee in International Maritime Organization (2009a) and
IMO Navigation (2017) (A.817(19), MSC.64(67))) for all vessels engaged in in-
ternational voyages, with very few ships exempted from this and is designed to
display either electronic navigational charts (ENC) or digital nautical charts
(DNC). ECDIS is central to a modern ship bridge and is also highly intercon-
nected with other systems (e.g., Navtex, AIS, sonar) and requires a minimum
of weekly ENC updates produced by official providers such as the UK and US
Hydrographic Offices. All three update methods, via Internet/satellite, USB
and CD/DVD, present network, hardware, and social engineering vulnerabili-
ties with potentially low EoE levels and high rewards for multiple attackers, as
shown in GPS World staff (2016). Further studies like CyberKeel (2014b) have
also shown that the underling ECDIS OS (e.g., Windows XP) and its flaws
could result in a multitude of attacks including the modification or deletion
of ECDIS data. With International Maritime Organization (2009a) amend-
ments to the SOLAS regulation, vessels equipped with ECDIS may use raster
chart display systems (RCDS) in case of failure, but many have opted for
a second, redundant, ECDIS instead (ECDIS Info (2014)). While useful for
mitigating accidents, redundant systems are less effective in providing robust
cyber-security as they may share identical cyber-vulnerabilities.
Automatic Identification System (AIS) was made mandatory for all ships
above a gross tonnage on international and non-international voyages, as stated
by International Maritime Organization (2004) Annex 17. To prevent colli-
sions, AIS signatures are broadcast by marine radio or satellite, i.e. S-AIS, with
ship identity (e.g., name, call sign), navigation status (e.g., at anchor), rate of
turn, heading, type, position, course, speed, and the bearing of shore stations,
other ships, and aircraft (IMO Navigation (2017)). This data is broadcast at
regular time intervals, and a typical ship’s class-A-transponder broadcasts its
position every five seconds when traveling faster than 23 knots. AIS transpon-
ders are also comprised of GPS and VHF radio commutation technologies,
both of which can be hacked via network and transponder protocol attacks as
demonstrated in Archives and Administration (2016) and Balduzzi (2014).
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Previous research like CyberKeel (2014a) and Mordechai et al (2014) have
also revealed numerous vulnerabilities in AIS to allow the modification of ship
details, create ghost vessels, false alerts, and modify signal transmission fre-
quency. In Wagstaff (2014) it was reported that Somali pirates used online AIS
data to identify and manipulate victims, as well as counterfeit AIS data to mis-
lead victims or obfuscate their own position. In Latin America & Caribbean
(2014), a North Korean ship concealing 240 tons of weapons reportedly turned
off its AIS to hide its voyage. These are not isolated events, as an Israeli firm
recently found that, in one day, 100 ships counterfeited AIS data and trans-
mitted incorrect locations. At the very least, criminal and terrorist attacker
types would have an interest in these systems based on their profiles.
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is a constellation of satellites that
transmit time and positions from orbit. The four satellite networks of note are
(1) US Global Positioning System (GPS), originally known as Navstar GPS,
is owned by the US government and run by the US Air Force, (2) Europe’s
Galileo, (3) the Chinese BeiDou system and (4) Russian Global Navigation
Satellite System (GLONASS). Satellite is used in the maritime sector for data
like global position and time. It is also one of the most interconnected and val-
ued IBS system. As GPS is connected with all on-board systems, sometimes
implicitly, risk may be propagated when location or timing is lost or spoofed.
Based on its value, GNSS would make a likely target for most attackers. More-
over, its low-energy signals are a significant technological weaknesses as it often
experiences interference from natural solar flares, the earth’s ionosphere, other
radio frequencies, and spectrum congestion. Therefore active interference, such
as jamming (i.e., denial-of-service) and spoofing (e.g., false time or position)
(Coffed (2014); Schmidt et al (2016); US Department of Homeland Security
(2015)), could present a high-value, low-effort cyber-attack. Due to the inter-
connected bridge, loss of GPS can also result in the failure of other important
systems such as AIS, speed logs, and Global Maritime Distress and Safety Sys-
tem as they rely heavily on timing and location. In Grant et al (2014), a GPS
jamming experiment was performed by the UK and Irish General Lighthouse
Authority on the ship Pole Star, which entered jamming zones to study the
resulting ship failures and crew reaction. North Korea has also actively used
GPS jammers against South Korean to interfere with military and civilians
systems at sea and on land, with an estimation of 700 ships affected in the
attacks, as stated in National PNT Advisory Board (2010).
Radio Detection And Ranging (Radar) detects physical objects by using radio
waves, i.e. microwaves on the electromagnetic spectrum, as shown by federal
codes in Archives and Administration (2016). While radar signals are more
difficult to jam than satellite, it is still possible with advanced techniques. It is
important to note that, while radar and other frequencies on the electromag-
netic spectrum (see Tam and Jones (2018b)) are susceptible to noise-based
jamming, or more advanced spoofing attacks, the mechanisms to achieve the
same effect are significantly different per system. This is due to the various
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frequency bands used, signal source, and signal destination. Jamming tech-
nologies previously developed for submarines and aircraft include mechanical,
electrical stealth, and intentional interference. Simplistic interference can oc-
cur when two radars are in close proximity and operate on the same frequency.
Sophisticated attacks may focus all its jamming power on a single frequency,
sweep full power through a range, jam several frequencies at its source, or fake
positioning by delaying pulse transmissions. In Coffed (2014), the GPS signal
of USS Donald Cook, a 4th generation guided missile destroyer, was completely
jammed by a Russian aircraft boasting sophisticated radar jamming technol-
ogy. While effort required for a denial of service (DoS) attack is relatively
low for any attacker, as a ship is equipped with more relied-upon navigation
systems, radar-based attacks may yield low-value rewards for a hacker.
NAVTEX or Navigational Telex was designated by the IMO to provide warn-
ings, urgent marine safety alerts, and both meteorological and navigational
forecasts via a radio technology, e.g. SITOR collective B-mode (Archives and
Administration (2016); Offshore Blue (2016)). While regulated receivers must
receive international broadcast frequencies at all times, non-regulated receivers
can switch frequencies. This simplicity and the fact that NAVTEX is not es-
sential in most scenarios means attackers have few methods or reasons for
attacking this system. In Figure 3, NAVTEX is one of the least technological
advanced navigational systems and is not able to produce as many effects as
AIS or ECDIS. That said, possible jamming attacks or an infected ship PC
may prevent NAVTEX signal decoding or allow message tampering, as seen in
Offshore Blue (2016) and Santamarta (2014b). Attacks may be used to delay
shipments or cause damage if sent into a storm and as some NAVTEX data is
now available for download via the internet, its EoE may increase.
Radionavigation was a popular radio-based navigation tool before the rise of
GNSS, as shown in Archives and Administration (2016). While some of these
technologies are obsolete (e.g., Transit and Omega hyperbolic satellites were
removed in the 1990’s), there has been an effort to bring back the navigation
system Loran-C as eLoran, a low frequency, long range navigation system. Pri-
marily redesigned as a complementary fall-back, i.e. an independent satellite
system that is harder to jam or spoof, eLoran has seen delays as many see it as
a redundant and outdated system, as Collier (2017) claims. If ever deployed,
eLoran would attract similar attackers as the other navigational systems (e.g.,
GNSS), but possibly less so if it is truly more robust against cyber-attacks.
3.2 Positioning Systems
Although similar to navigation, positioning systems have been placed in a
separate category as these technologies report data on more immediate sur-
roundings, which leads to different effects when cyber-attacked. These systems
often interface with navigation, as the data derived from them are useful for
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guidance. For example, a loss in GPS signal could significantly affect position
fixing, although approximate positioning can be made solely based on ship
sensors. This, however, can lead to in-accurate positioning.
According to this Degani (2004) incident report, the “Royal Majesty”
cruise ship grounded itself due to a disconnected GPS antenna cable. Be-
cause of this, the ship’s autopilot was unable to take into account the effects
of wind, current, and sea conditions, and it went into dead reckoning mode
which resulted in a 17-mile discrepancy. As the outcomes of attacking sensors
for position fixing can be unpredictable, it is more likely an attacker will invest
the effort into exploiting navigational systems. However, increasing navigation
cyber-security may shift attacker attention. Figure 4 summarizes these posi-
tioning systems and maps each to its core technologies and possible effects. To
make it more visually comprehensible, common items are underlined.
Sailing Directions published by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
(NGA) and the UK Hydrographic Office provide planning and en-route guides
for ship crews. It interfaces with navigation systems like ECDIS and contains
time zones, coastlines, ports, harbors, firing areas, search and rescue informa-
tion (Dyryavyy (2014)). In one of the worst oil spills in history attributed to
inaccurate sailing directions, the bulk carrier Sanko Harvest grounded on a
reef causing massive damage due to out-dated sailing direction information.
More recently, Offshore Blue (2013) reported ship damaged a fish cultivation
area because it was not marked on the ship’s charts. This was due to miss-
ing local chart data, which had not been uploaded and on-route updates were
disabled due to a non-functioning NAVTEX system. Extrapolating from these
incidences, intentional attacks could cause ships to enter or avoid certain zones,
which could be useful for manipulation, but may not provide enough precision
to be useful cyber-attack.
Speed measurements can be made with multiple technologies, even calculated
with propeller rotations. For example, in extreme cases Sound Navigation and
Ranging (SONAR) devices can send sound waves to fixed objects under the
water surface to measure speed. Echo sounding in particular, is a type of
SONAR that normally measures depth but can also be used to measure speed
using known seabed features. These are relatively safe against cyber-attacks,
but not normally used on an average ship (with the primary exception of the
military). However, today, GPS measurements are more commonly used for
more accurate speed readings. As mentioned previously, the vulnerabilities of
GPS mean it has the most cyber-attack vectors of all the speed measuring
technologies. The vulnerabilities, cost, and rewards of attacking GPS have
already been discussed above. Tampering with the sonar system might have
little consequences as any ship with sonar, although rare, would often have
redundant systems. That said, however unlikely, unreliable sonar readings have
resulted in collision incidences. For example, two nuclear submarines collided
within the Atlantic Ocean, as their anti-sonar devices prevented both vessels
from detecting each other, as was reported in BBC News (2009).
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Fig. 4 Effects and technologies of positioning and propulsion system within MaCRA.
Anemometers measure wind speed. Its accuracy depends on the shape and
structure of a ship, as the hull and superstructures (e.g., towers and cranes)
could result in airflow distortions, leading to biased wind speed measurements.
The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) Voluntary Observing Ship
(VOS) program recruits thousands of merchant ships to report meteorological
conditions on the ocean’s surface and then, after accounting for any bias as
mentioned previously, produce detailed weather forecasts. The system itself is
not likely to be of high interest to an attacker due to its low impact. However,
from a cyber-security point of view, if it is possible to gain control of higher-
valued systems on the same network, its reward value as a target would increase
from an attacker’s perspective. This becomes possible as devices connect to the
network or use wireless repeaters. While crossing the Atlantic Ocean, a large
passenger ship was once affected by the loss of its anemometer. Furthermore,
one of the radar scanners was damaged and stopped working. While the lack
of wind speed measurements made travel more difficult, the trained crew was
able to take the vessel to safety with an eight hour delay, as it was reported
in Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) (1997).
VDRs i.e. voyage data recorders, have been made mandatory by the IMO for
all passenger ships and those over 3,000 GRT (gross register tonnage) to help
investigations. VDR’s constantly record and store the date, time, ship position,
speed, heading, bridge audio, communication audio, radar, AIS, depth, main
alarms, wind speed, direction, and anything else that an investigator may find
useful. This is analogous to the “Black Box” known for airplane incidences.
While the data itself is unlikely to be stolen, as a secondary cyber-attack, evi-
dence can be altered or wiped to protect the attackers. In Santamarta (2015), it
was reported that an Indian cargo ship’s VDR data files were overwritten and
lost using a USB stick. This resulted in the loss of data for a 12 hour period,
during which the vessel had collided with a fishing trawler. Similar actions
could be done intentionally as obstruction. Analysis of VDRs has shown weak
encryption, insecure authentication, a flawed firmware update mechanism, and
various services plagued by buffer overflows and command injection vulnera-
bilities. Due to the VDR design, it is most likely to be attacked physically
by an insider, and less likely for a sophisticated attacker to attack remotely,
which MaCRA can model with differing EoE and reward factors.
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Fig. 5 Mapping of effects and technologies of communication systems.
3.3 Communication and Networking Systems
This section examines three forms of communication, those meant for humans,
machines, and human-machine interactions. A summary of these systems can
be found in Figure 5, which demonstrate how, due to the nature of communi-
cation, the likeliest cyber-attack on these systems will have a denial of service
effect (DoS) to prevent communications such as distress calls.
Global maritime distress and safety system (GMDSS) is a collection of auto-
mated emergency communication equipment and protocols considered as one
of the basic global requirements for ocean-going ships SeaCert (2016). The
main system components of a GMDSS are (1) emergency position-indicating
radio beacon (EPIRB), (2) NAVTEX to distribute maritime safety informa-
tion (MSI), (3) Inmarsat global mobile services overseen by the international
mobile satellite organization (IMSO), (4) high-frequency radiotelephone and
narrow-band radiotelex for communication, (5) search and rescue transpon-
ders based on radar (SART) for distress signals, such as the Cospas System,
and (6) digital selective calling (DSC). Thus GMDSS requires a range of ra-
dio frequencies for ship-to-ship distress alerts, search and rescue coordination,
on-scene communication, maritime safety information, and bridge-to-bridge
connections (Archives and Administration (2016)). Preventing communication
can isolate a target and disrupt rescue attempts and GMDSS is particularly
vulnerable to malicious firmware which, if installed, can allow an attacker to
control devices on-board and deliver false data by spoofing and disrupting
signals (Santamarta (2014a)).
Ship Security Alert System (SSAS) was created to strengthen maritime se-
curity with covert transmissions of satellite (Inmarsat D+) and radio alerts
to local authorities (Archives and Administration (2016)). More specifically,
SSAS beacons were designed to suppress acts of terrorism, piracy, and mutiny,
therefore being denied communication in a cyber-attack is concerning. SSAS
is not currently required to be integrated with the more generic GMDSS, but
they can be combined in order to contact law-enforcement. Conversely, dedi-
cated SSAS modules are available if integration is undesirable.
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Fig. 6 Mapping of effects and technologies of identification systems in MaCRA.
Internet access on ships is provided via the shipboard network, which has
a gateway to the global internet. This in turn provides local networks for
personal usage and to connect ship systems. Typically, ship workstations con-
nected to the internet will be running older versions of Microsoft Windows
(e.g., XP), although some may run Linux, both of which are common on-
shore OSs with well-researched network-based attack surfaces (Simon and Ray
(2005)). Furthermore, the average age of the global fleet (i.e., 20.3 years Inter-
national Chamber of Shipping (2016)) and long voyages have lead to outdated
systems and large windows of opportunities, where an cyber-attack can occur
after a vulnerability is discovered but before the ship can be updated. Internet-
reliant technology like email is one of the many potential attack-vectors, where
dangerous software can be downloaded, or the user can be guided to dangerous
websites. Internet-based attacks are already widely used in many sectors, and
can be very sophisticated. If the on-board network system has weak encryp-
tion algorithms or insecure protocols (e.g., hard-coded credentials), remote
attackers may easily take remove control of critical ship systems via internet
connection, as shown in Santamarta (2014a). As ship networks are not often
segregated, and insecure, a single attack could affect multiple systems (Simon
and Ray (2005)). One compromised personal device could weaken the overall
IBS security, and so it is important to consider all systems from a security per-
spective, despite how trivial a system may seem from a maritime perspective.
Lastly, as bandwidth capabilities increase, ship systems like NAVTEX are in-
creasing their internet dependencies to obtain data, entertain guest/crew, and
interact with foreign systems. As network interconnectivity increases, and as
more network-dependent solutions arise (Costa et al (2018)), the reward value
of an attack dramatically increases, while EoE may stay relatively static.
Long-ranged identification and tracking (LRIT) provides global ship identity
data, similar to AIS, and ship tracking. International Maritime Organization
(2009b) SOLAS mandate some ships to carry LRIT, although it is rarer than
other mentioned systems, making it less viable for large-scale cyber-attacks.
When compared to AIS, LRIT has more global coverage as it only uses satellite
and utilizes a more secure end-to-end data transfer, as it is a closed architec-
ture. LRIT protocols are therefore inaccessible, whereas open systems (e.g.,
AIS) are open to modification and therefore less cyber-secure. Compromising
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LRIT cannot misdirect ships the way a compromised AIS can, but as it is key
for search and rescue services when upgraded with GMDSS Inmarsat C, DoS
is the most concerning and plausible cyber-attack on this system.
3.4 Identification and Information Systems
Several of the systems discussed in the previous sections also serve as identifi-
cation broadcasters. For example, frequent AIS broadcasts must also include
the vessel’s maritime mobile service identity (MMSI), IMO ship identification
number, name, radio call sign, type and dimension of ship, and destination, ac-
cording to International Maritime Organization (2004). Similarly, LRIT also
transmits vessel name, IMO number, and MMSI identification. However, in
comparison to AIS broadcasts, LRIT transmission data is more secure from
3rd parties. It has been speculated that pirates have used ship ID data to target
and monitor specific ships. To mitigate this relatively new behavior, practices
(see BigOceanData (2016)) have been altered so ships are allowed to switch off
their AIS to avoid such situations. Lastly, AIS allows on-shore authorities to
identify vessels within a nation’s exclusive economic zone. If AIS information
can be turned off or altered, attackers can obfuscate their activities to avoid
detection during repeated crimes or those with a long duration.
Vessel monitoring systems (VMS) can be considered as the fishing equivalent
of the more generic AIS. However, VMS is only mandatory for a small per-
centage of fishing vessels, as the vast majority are less than 24 meters and
thus exempt (Franckx (2001)). VMS uses automatic location communications
(ALC), the most widely accepted of which is an Inmarsat-C transceiver with
built-in GPS. Primarily satellite-based, as opposed to AIS’s mostly VHF-based
radio, this closed proprietary service is a ship-to-shore communicator which
is more suited for fishing routes as they tend to follow coastlines more closely
than others. VMS transmits essentially the same data as AIS (e.g., location,
identification numbers) and VMS protocols have been similarly altered in the
past to obfuscate illegal activities, as seen in Balduzzi (2014) and Krner et al
(2009), but the cyber-risks are slightly different as only large fishing vessels
would be affected and operates primarily on a different frequency.
3.5 Cargo and Machinery Management Systems
Including ship systems and ship-to-port interfaces, cargo and machinery man-
agement systems are vulnerable when access is unrestricted, identifications are
checked incorrectly or infrequently, and when access points are not physically
protected. Currently, MaCRA does not consider port-based systems, although
it can be extended to encompass it in future work (see Section 7). Although
more simplistic than the previous MaCRA axiss mappings, Figure 7 shows cargo
(e.g., gas) and machinery management systems. This may change drastically
as technology, like automation (Zhang and Ioannou (2006)), evolves.
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Fig. 7 Mapping of effects and technologies of cargo and machinery systems.
General cargo deck machinery are pump and motor systems used to power
deck winches, cranes, derricks, and windlasses. This machinery performs the
heavy lifting regarding cargo and ship equipment, but may perform other func-
tions such as anchoring. The exploit pay-off of these systems would nominally
be destroying or stealing cargo, but may include physical damage to the ship,
nearby entities, or the environment. Direct attacks are currently unlikely given
the limited cyber-attack surface, and it is more likely that the IBS or engineer-
ing, e.g. supervisory controls and SCADA networks, will be targeted to gain
access. As an example recent rise of cyber-attacks on similar SCADA systems,
like water treatment plants (Igure et al (2006); Leyden (2016)) have shown
vulnerabilities that may also apply to similar on-board networks.
Mooring ships is evolving from manual labor to automated systems, which
were developed to improve physical safety and efficiency. Although automated
mooring help ports this way, a hacker may achieve the opposite effect if a
ship were to collide with onshore structures or cause congestion. This could
be achieved today, as modern mooring technology can be remotely control via
radio (Cavotec (2014); MOOREX (2014)). This results in several networking
vulnerabilities such as DoS via radio jamming, power cut, and packet replay.
The latter occurs when a previous, legitimate, command is recorded and played
back to perform the action once again. Similar techniques have been used
previously for car-jacking, as demonstrated in Francillon et al (2011).
3.6 The Human Factor and Specialized Systems
Although systems are becoming more sophisticated, even automated, humans
still account for a large part of a working ship. Studies like Rothblum (2000)
estimate that 75%-96% of maritime casualties are caused, at least in part, by
human error. While this has traditionally pertained to machinery-based acci-
dents (Allianz Global Corporate and Specialty SE (2016)), it is becoming more
prevalent in the cyber sector. Training and awareness are needed to prevent
social-engineering based attacks as well as prepare, and better equip, crew
and on-shore teams to quickly detect, deter, and mitigate cyber-attacks. The
human factor is therefore an important aspect to consider, as manipulating a
person via cyber-attacks can be equally devastating as attacking a system’s
technology in terms of economic loss, reputation loss, and physical damage. In
summary, while malware can be used to compromise devices, blackmail and
phishing emails can be used to compromise people if unprepared.
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Insider threats are a critical aspect of cyber-security as they can often
access information that reduce the effort required to launch certain attacks
(i.e., increase EoE). Insider threats may be caused by a disgruntled or malicious
employee, a compromised (e.g., blackmailed) insider, or a malicious attacker
who acquired legitimate access via legal or illegal means. Disgruntled insider
threats, BIMCO et al (2016), may often act as activists, if possessing goals
like whistle-blowing, or criminals, if financially motivated. For example, an
increase in disgruntled mariners has resulted in at least one staged pirate
attack (MarEx (2016)). There have also been increases in exploitation, with
employees blackmailed both on-shore and at sea (European Cybercrime center
(2014) ESC Global Security (2015)). As ships and crew physically move and
connect to a wide range of local and foreign networks, there is a higher chance
of insecure network connections than normal, stationary work locations.
As a subset of extortion, sextortion is a growing concern and the U.S.
Navy has seen an increase in reported instances with victims having paid in
excess of $11,000 to perpetrators (U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command
(2017a,b)). As an example of accidental insider threats, social media such as
Facebook have been reportedly used as an intelligence source for criminals in
the Gulf of Aden (CyberKeel (2014a)). In one case, although a ship passenger
uploaded detailed images of vessel safety measures to their Facebook account,
the crew were aware of the possible consequences and altered the ship’s course
before entering the gulf. As demonstrated by this example, awareness levels of
how systems and information should be protected can greatly help or hinder
a ship in the event of a maritime cyber-attack, which is why targetresources is
an important factor modeled by MaCRA to assess cyber-risks.
Apart from the human factor there are a few more specialized systems to be
address. This is an incomplete list, as ships can be highly specialized and mod-
ified, but includes some notable technologies for maritime-cyber risk. Access to
the inert gas system, which is used to prevent explosions on oil tankers, could
have a significant incentives for certain attackers. As the operator terminals for
these systems are available via either MODBUS or Ethernet, network-based
attacks are feasible, as discussed in Norway (2017). Similar scenarios include
protection and maintenance systems (e.g., cooling, heating, ballast), which are
essential for ship, crew, and cargo safety. Such systems are still primarily
mechanism-based, but could be controlled through a computer terminal, e.g.
in engineering. That said, engine control rooms (ECRs) are becoming increas-
ingly dependent on growing information technology systems, as seen in Man
et al (2018). Pentesting (see Section 6) is likely needed to determine specific
vulnerabilities in specific cases. Another system worth mentioning is monitor-
ing. There has been recent demands for CCTV like camera solutions on ships.
As a common technology, it is an established system with known vulnera-
bilities, as seen in Costin (2016) and Heffner (2013). Cyber-attacks against
monitoring may be more useful for covering up internal crimes, but may be
used with sophisticated external physical attacks.
The integrated bridge system (IBS) was introduced as a collection of tech-
nologies, however the IBS itself must be viewed as a single system. There are
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several products available today provided by companies like Raytheon, eGlobe,
Kongsberg, ECPINS, Sperry, JRC and Transas. Apart from the construction,
e.g. how systems are connected, policies on system interactions are essential,
as the combined systems result in complex sets of possible configurations and
actions. For example, how the IBS should to react if GPS signal is lost would
determine important policy, as displaying incorrect data may be more detri-
mental than disabling the screen. Similarly, alert and warning systems should
be designed to support crews, otherwise high priority alarms may be ignored
or missed, as stated in Traub and Hudson (2007). Maliciously triggering or si-
lencing alarms could also drastically distract and stress crew. Future work, see
in Section 6, will include the engine room, as it is another area where systems
are evolving and converging, likely increasing cyber-risks.
Lastly, it seems important to mention eAtoNs. Previously, AIS was men-
tioned as a ship anti-collision system. More recently, stationary AIS aids to
navigation (AtoN) beacons have been installed on navigational hazards, such
as wind farms, oil platforms, bridges, and buoys to provide anti-collision data
for stationary objects. More recently, virtual electronic AtoNs (eAtoNs) have
been introduced to environments where physical AtoNs are impossible or prob-
lematic to anchor. This includes coral reefs and Arctic passages where ice
movements present a challenge, as described in Weintrit (2015). While not yet
a widespread practice, as these virtual objects exist firmly within the cyber
domain and cannot be visually, physically, checked, this could be a high-risk
target for hackers seeking collision and misdirection incidences.
4 MaCRA Risk Assessment Examples
From the data gathered on maritime systems, attacker profiles, and possible
outcomes in Sections 2 and 3, MaCRA can be sufficiently populated for several
demonstrative risk assessments. These are designed to show complex cyber-risk
information in a human-friendly format. The set of discussed vulnerabilities
and their potential effects have been collated into Table 3, excluding special-
ized systems from Section 3.6 and those outside the scope of this study. From
Table 3, axiss of MaCRA would map two points for the VDR system as it has
two possible cyber-attack effects, (VDR : DoS) and (VDR : obfuscation),
four points for ECDIS, etc. Within this study, the full set of effects considered
are damage, theft, denial of service, misdirect, and obfuscate. As the
MaCRA dataset grows with realistic shipping data, more types or subtypes may
be considered to maintain useful assessments. Axise and axisr are modeled
using the defined activist, competitor, criminal, and terrorist hacker types.
Details of target and attacker attributes are varied and discussed within each
scenario, and were specifically chosen to create interesting scenarios for MaCRA
to assess. Sections 4.1 – 4.4 demonstrate basic projected views and filters
within MaCRA, while Section 4.5 has a fuller discussion of MaCRA’s risk assess-
ment abilities with a detailed scenario and more realistic hacker and ship data.
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Table 3 System vulnerabilities and effects considered in MaCRA.
Cyber Vulnerabilities System Physical/Cyber Effect(s)
[USB, SCADA] Deck Machinery [damage, theft]
[radio, power] Auto-Mooring [DoS, damage]
[USB*, s*, Internet, IBS] ECDIS [DoS, damage, mis*, theft]
[VHF, s*, radar, IBS] AIS [DoS, damage, mis*, theft, obfu*]
[s*] GNSS [damage, mis*]
[radar] Radar [DoS, o]
[USB*, s*, Internet] IBS/Main PC [DoS, damage, mis*, theft, obfu*]
[USB*, Internet, NBDP, IBS] NAVTEX [DoS, damage]
[radio, LORAN] Radionav [DoS, damage]
[radio, s*, ECDIS, NAVTEX, IBS] Position Fix [DoS, damage, mis*]
[SONAR, s*, propeller] Speed Logs [DoS, damage, mis*]
[] Anemometers [DoS, m]
[USB*, IBS] VDR [DoS, obfu*]
[radio, NAVTEX, s*, radar] GMDSS [DoS, damage]
[s*, SSAS] LRIT [DoS, damage, theft, obfu*]
[radio, NAVTEX, s*, radar] SSAS [DoS, theft, obfu*]
[s*, USB*, IBS] Internet [DoS, damage, mis*, theft, obfu*]
[s*, LORAN] VMS [DoS, damage, theft, obfu*]
[network, IBS] CCTV [DoS, obfu*]
[MODBUS, network] Cargo Maintenance [damage]
s* = satellite, mis* = misdirect, obfu* = obfuscation, *USB =+ CD/DVD
The following scenario-based assessments have been designed to show-case
MaCRA’s ability to model, discover, and assess maritime cyber-security risks.
As the first four of the examples only extract a small number of systems, at-
tackers, and targets, the resulting assessments may seem simplistic, as they
only utilize the data needed for specific assessments. Future work and details
(e.g., directly from shipping companies) would be required for a complete risk-
assessment model of the global fleet. However, based on current International
Maritime Organization (2004, 2009a,b) regulations, the vast majority of ships
are equipped with the systems detailed in Table 3. Thus, the following ex-
amples could be considered relevant as real-world assessments, and any lack
of detail does not prevent this study from demonstrating how MaCRA can be
used to view and assess maritime-cyber risk. Moreover, MaCRA is still func-
tional despite vague or missing details by substituting ranges for fixed values
when defining attacker and target attributes (see Section 2.4). This allows an
analyst to perform realistic assessments with moderate levels of data.
4.1 Yacht Scenario: Hactivist vs Criminal
In this scenario cyber-risks of a yacht is shown. The wealth of targety’s pas-
sengers makes them, and their data, of interest to criminals (attackerc). In
addition, local hacktivists (attackerh), are concerned about boating activity
in a delicate marine region. While targety is equipped with some network-
defenses, the ship has several custom network-connected systems (e.g., per-
sonal entertainment), which introduces more cyber-vulnerabilities than nor-
mal. To compare the risks of attackerc and attackerh on targety, these data
can be modeled and extrapolated into Figure 8 to aid passenger decisions.
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Fig. 8 Yacht risks considering activist and criminal hackers with ranged Ease-of-Exploit.
Fig. 9 Naval vessel’s risk considering terrorist and activist hackers with ranged reward.
This specific view of model data shows that the top risks are information
theft by attackerh via the main bridge computer, followed by misdirection and
theft, physical and intellectual, by attackerc via ECDIS or AIS. Passengers can
conclude targety’s highest risk is information theft, as both considered hackers
would find it a low-cost, high-reward attack. The view of the same data may
imply different conclusions, however, if the yacht manufacture is analyzing the
risks from all potential hackers including terrorists and competitors.
The Figure 8 projection of MaCRA model data onto a comprehensible risk
plane can also help the yacht passengers quickly conclude that physical damage
is low-risk and not a top priority for securing, despite the fear factor. Figure 8
also demonstrates how MaCRA can model ranges for attacker attributes instead
of fixed values. This is useful, as the model can assess subsets of attackertype
and different attackerresource levels. Human analysts, like insurers, can then
compare risks associated with the best or worst case scenarios by varying
variables. In this projection, as activists tend to be smaller organizations (i.e.,
attacker tier1−3), horizontal dotted lines can be used to extend EoE into higher
tiers to show that this group is likely to have less resources to spend on an
attack, decreasing ease. Conversely, criminal types range widely (i.e., attacker
tier1−5) and so the dotted lines are distributed more evenly across axise.
As can be seen, this shifts the risk of attackerc into a higher risk zone than
attackerh. The last factor to consider regarding resources is their impact on
the outcome, as shown by the dotted line’s length. For example, jamming
ultimately works independently of the user’s skill, and would therefore have a
shorter line than more skill-dependent cyber-attacks, like data theft.
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Figure 8 also demonstrates how MaCRA can instantly re-assess risks, as vari-
ables change in real-time, to better inform human-based decisions. This is par-
ticularly critical when trying to assess risk when factors are quick to change.
For instance, a new piece of malware may have been released or there are
increased competitions between two companies. This example demonstrates
that, if attackerh lost resources in a police raid, their EoE would lower. Simi-
larly, if targety missed an important AIS security patch, the risk profile would
change again. MaCRA is capable of modeling these changes, as demonstrated by
the arrows in Figure 8, whether adapting to real-time changes or pre-change
to help an analyst decide which security actions would most optimally and
effectively decrease risk. It is that, or try to anticipate future risks.
4.2 Military Scenario: Terrorist vs Hacktivist
From an examination of military concerns, navy ships seem at most risk when
considering terrorists and hactivists (i.e., attackert, attackerh). For instance,
it seems unlikely for a criminal hacker to target the military unless they have
terrorist tendencies or connections to such organizations. In this scenario, mil-
itary targetn is equipped with a state-of-the-art anti-jamming GPS for its
missile guidance, but lesser radio-based communications could be jammed.
Furthermore, the underlying bridge OS is outdated which, despite additional
military hardening, has some vulnerabilities. The goal of attackerh is to delay
military operations in protest, whereas attackert is interested in intelligence
information and possibly compromising targetn’s missile weapon system.
From this scenario assessment, shown in Figure 9, the top risk based on
the risk quadrants is information theft. Both modeled hackers would be in-
terested in the data and, even if neither were, a third party would likely be.
Furthermore, the vulnerable OS in this scenario increases the attack EoE. In
comparison, while attackert may be equally, or more, interested in compro-
mising the weapon system, it is much better protected and very difficult to
compromise, which is also apparent when compared to risks in Figure 8. As
each attacker type has sub-sets or sub-types (e.g., terrorist factions), Figure 9
supplements single tiers with ranging attackergoal and attackerresources vari-
ables using vertical dotted lines. The range of interest tends to be wide in niche
outcomes, as they may be very valuable or not at all for different attackers.
While it is possible to show additional shifts in risks based on variables
that changes EoE (see Figure 8), this assessment shall demonstrate the MaCRA
framework’s ability to reflect risk changes on the reward axis due change in the
target. Specifically, Figure 9 demonstrates the change in risk if targetn were to
offload its missiles at a base or if the target were to venture into a region of low
visibility, as a loss in navigation would suit attackerh’s goal of delaying naval
operations. This is to demonstrate an aspect of MaCRA’s capabilities while, in
reality and later scenarios, the effect of relevant attribute changes are much
more elaborate and may impact both reward and EoE differently for various
systems or attackers at different levels.
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Fig. 10 Common filtered risks of a competitor hacker on both old and new cargo ships.
Fig. 11 Common filtered risks for fishing and cruise ships with criminal hacker.
4.3 Competitor Scenario: New vs Old Cargo Ships
In this scenario, Figure 10 projects views a company might generate to help as-
sess the cyber-risks associated with a competitor (attackerc) deploying cyber-
attacks. The targeted company can also use MaCRA to filter out acceptable
risks for optimal cyber-security investing. In this scenario one of the targeted
ships is 30 years old and the other is brand new, i.e. targeto and targetn. This
illustrates how MaCRA assessments can highlight subtle, yet essential, target
differences when considering risks, as these ships share similarities in function.
While individual systems on targeto may have more vulnerabilities, air gaps
between non-networked systems prevent some attacks and low bandwidths
decrease both EoE and reward for a hacker. Conversely, the newer ship has
cyber-defenses, although not fully tested. This helps the hacker objectives,
as its complexities and interconnectivity increase the cyber-attack surface.
Within this scenario, attackerc is saboteurs on both target ships intending to
steal or alter data, such as manifests and schedules.
Another tool MaCRA provides for real-world assessments is the ability to
define acceptable and not-acceptable risks, as security solutions can be costly
and most risks cannot be reduced to zero. Section 2.4 first introduced ease
and reward filters (i.e., Fe, Fr) for this purpose, and in this scenario, the
targeted company has chosen to invest most of its resources to protect the
newer targetn against cyber-attacks. Therefore, as shown by the filtered gray
areas in Figure 10, Fe classifies more acceptable risks on the targeto than
targetn. As Fe filters are based on attacker effort, sophisticated attacks are
determined as acceptable risks under the assumption that they are unlikely to
happen when considering the average hacker’s available resources.
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4.4 Criminal Scenario: Fishing vs Cruise Ship
In this scenario, MaCRA models one criminal attackerc and two targets, fishing
vessel targetf and cruise ship targetc, and assess the relevant risks from an in-
surer’s point of view. While the international, luxury passenger cruise targetc
has more security built into the ship than a targetf , it is not sophisticated
enough to prevent advanced attacks (i.e., tiers4−5) and the presence of pas-
sengers would make any cyber-attack high-profile. Conversely, there is vastly
less security on targetf which may make both intellectual and physical theft
easier. However, the fishing vessel’s route never takes it too far from shore,
thus response the time of authorities will be short, minus a DoS attack.
A projected risk view to aid assessment can be found in Figure 11, demon-
strating the use of MaCRA’s reward filter Fr. The purpose of this filter is to
separate risks associated with low-reward attacks, despite the EoE. Such risks,
within this particular scenario, are then disregarded solely based on the as-
sumption that the outcomes are not worth attackerc’s effort. An insurer as-
sessor may therefore use this filter to measure the number of non-acceptable
risks when considering a cyber-risk quote.
Within this scenario, the company that owns targetc has delegated more
resources for ship cyber-defenses than the fishing company has for targetf .
This is illustrated by the placement of the Fe filters in Figure 11. The differ-
ently sized risk quadrants defined by these filters determine different sets of
acceptable and non-acceptable risks based on attackerc’s most desired goals.
For targetf , the assessment determines its main risks are AIS-based theft and
ECDIS misdirection. These two are also ranked high for passenger ships. In
addition, this scenario’s targetc is at-risk to GMDSS denial of service, VDR
obfuscation, and kidnapping due to the non-trivial rewards for attackerc. More
realistically however, an assessment would use both Fe and Fr filters to classify
ECDIS misdirection for fishing and kidnapping for cruises as acceptable risks,
as the attackereffort seems extreme, but for demonstration purposes this and
the previous example only utilized one filter each.
4.5 Other Views: Realistic Tanker Scenario
As the MaCRA framework models a plethora of information in a multi-dimensional
space, there are many ways to extract the data for different people to assess
scenarios based on their cyber-risk interests. Therefore the data projections
in Figures 8-11 are not the only way to view the model risk-data. In this last
subsection, MaCRA assessments are made with more realistic data, as shown in
Table 4. While previous scenarios selected a small subset of attackers, ships,
and systems to view narrow assessments and different MaCRA capabilities, all
hacker profiles and systems discussed in this article are used here. As MaCRA
is currently unable to model the entire global fleet, Table 4 models fictional
oil tankers targetA and targetB . Typographic differences in Figure 4 illus-
trate how different attributes effect the model data. Additional columns can
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Table 4 A more realistic MaCRA risk model for two oil tankers.
be added later to extend the model to encompass additional ships or new
attacker profiles, and more rows may be added if more (system : effect)
pairs are introduced or discovered, especially as technology evolves.
In this scenario, targetA carries a secure IBS system and on-board com-
puter. It is sailing without cargo on route1, which includes ports shared with
other shipping companies, and enters a moderate hot-zone for pirate activity.
The second oil tanker targetB is carrying cargo, but does not have the same
security upgrades. However, targetB ’s ECDIS in isolation is more secure in
comparison. Lastly, targetB ’s route passes a terrorist zone and physically nar-
row channels that may make land-based DoS attacks more feasible. From this
data MaCRA can, for example, use both Fe and Fr filters to identify several
sets of risk. Such sets may be categorized into low-, medium-, and high-risks,
or acceptable and non-acceptable. For example, consider Figure 12’s four risk
quadrants (i.e., riskq) defined by Fe and Fr. Low risks sit in the bottom-left
quadrant, medium equates to the two light gray quadrants, and the set of high-
risks in the top right quadrant. Similarly, on the same figure, the three gray
quadrants may be considered acceptable risks whereas the top right quadrant
would remain as high, non-acceptable risks. If no filters are present, riskq may
be defined by dividing the space into equal quadrants.
Similarly, the risk of each (system : effect) pair on axiss may be quan-
tified by calculating its distance (i.e., riskd) to the origin using risk indicator
I() as it was presented in Section 2. The may be done in isolation, or to
rank risks within the previously defined sets. The latter is recommended, as
calculating riskd alone can be misleading. For example, although the riskd
of two systems may be the same, a military target would most likely rank a
low-EoE risk higher than high-EoE risk, as they must be prepared for highly-
sophisticated adversaries, despite how resource consuming a cyber-attack may
seem. When considering the highest risks of targetB after applying the filters
Fe and Fr in Figure 12, terrorist damage ranks highest with a riskd of 32.2,
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Fig. 12 Averaged summed effect risks of Tanker B with risk quadrants defined by filters.
followed by criminal and terrorist theft, riskd of 21.59 and 20.52 respectively.
As this tanker’s route passes through a known terrorist zone that targetA does
not (see Table 4), this is as expected. The other high risks may also be the
result of an IBS that is more vulnerable than the one in targetB . The reason
that the table values of Figure 12 exceed the normal 1-5 tiers as defined in
Table 4, is that each row is the summation of all similar effects despite the
system that caused this effect. As each value in MaCRA’s risk assessment model
is defined with the system and effect, one can also assess the total risk of one
system through the summation of reward and EoE values to create a new point
or zone. As the summation method may be applied to fixed values or variable
ranges, this can create risk zones, i.e., riskz, for further consideration.
Risk zones, as shown by Figure 13, may be useful when considering ranges
of attacker attributes and target resources, as it may be impossible to identify
all relevant factors at the time of assessment. Figure 13 sums the risk of each
system in Table 4 so that each row represents a system’s risk, despite the
attack effect. This pushes technologies with multiple vulnerabilities further
into the high-risk quadrant. For a human assessor wishing to determine which
system upgrade would reduce risks most, this is a useful extrapolation of model
data. While Figures 12 and 13 reduce matrix rows, applying the summation
method to targets or attackers can reduce the model columns to determine
risks disregarding attackertype or individual targets. In summation, the three
MaCRA methods for measuring or displaying risk discussed have been:
• Riskd: Calculates risk with indicator function I() as defined in Section 2.4
as the distance from the origin point or area of risk (see Figure 12). A
higher riskd equates to more risk;
• Riskz: Risk zones, e.g. Figure 13, use variable ranges to view multiple
scenarios at once;
• Riskq: The projected view’s planes are divided into quadrants, equal sized
or filter defined (e.g., Figure 12), to label risks as low, medium, high, ac-
ceptable, or non-acceptable.
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Fig. 13 Summed competitor risk zones (riskz) for Tanker A.
While MaCRA is intended to be considered as three dimensional, dimen-
sions can be reduced to show analysts cyber-risk pieces of the whole picture
as each axis, in actuality, reflects a series of variables as shown in equations
(3) - (5). These projected views are useful for a range of assessments, and
demonstrate how MaCRA data can filtered and displayed to provide insight on
various maritime cyber-risk related aspects. For example, by disregarding the
attacker and only view system components of axiss, one can visualize the most
vulnerable technological systems and what effects those can cause. This view
has already been demonstrated in Figures 3-7 and could, for example, enable
a person to identify and improve the most vulnerable system(s), or identify
all systems that could result in one undesired effect. This is essential for fur-
thering cyber-security and physical-security research for maritime systems as
MaCRA risk assessments would ideally highlight the most at-risk systems either
individually or globally once it is fully propagated (see Section 6).
The last possible projected MaCRA views to discuss concerns the definition
of attacker and target, i.e. equations (1) and (2). Instead of defining a target
as one physical system, ship, or set of ships, MaCRA has the ability to consider
systems from several ships or structures when assessing risk for one loosely-
defined target. This is ideal for modeling systems with frequent interactions,
such as ship-to-port interfacing or attackers that work together intentionally
or unintentionally. For example, if a ship requires services from a tug boat
or land-based cargo crane, the relevant subsystems may be considered in the
threat matrix with the original ship as one target, instead of modeling all
entities as individual targets. This functionality, demonstrated in Figure 14,
can model risks in frequent system interaction, and in the future this ability
whall be further developed for more varied, detailed risk assessments.
The purpose of this section was to demonstrate how the MaCRA model is
capable of holding all risk-relevant data for maritime cyber-security, and how
a number of assessment views can be produced to compare known risks and
discover new, previously unconsidered, risks. The ability to model attacker
and target attributes, including relevant semantics, makes MaCRA a powerful
risk assessment tool in a quickly developing maritime-cyber landscape for re-
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Fig. 14 Risk of ship systems and relevant subsystems of other vessels.
liably identifying acceptable and non-acceptable risks with quantified values.
Assessors are also provided with model data to determine which systems are
high-risk and why (e.g., what impact they can cause) and what types of at-
tackers are most likely to be interested in attacking those targets.
5 Related Work and Limitations
The purpose of this study is to enable a range of groups and individuals,
interested in different aspects of cyber-risk, to comprehensively assess any risks
maritime systems might have without excluding any technology that may seem
unimportant, as ot may actually pose a large risk when considering cyber-
security instead of physical or accidental. Differing from existing research,
this will better enabling people to make maritime cyber-security decisions by
fully understanding their risks will help focus global efforts through informed
decisions. It is clear that, not only do threats and hazards need to be identified
and controlled better, but they also need to be eliminated in the maritime
sector, based on a mariner opinion survey in Daszuta and Ghosh (2018). To
put this in to context, this section discusses how related works are dissimilar,
as well as highlight what this article does not cover. This transitions into the
following Section 6, “Future Work” where these limitations can be removed.
The focus of this article is not on predicting incident risks, human or
machinery-based, or accident statistics, as has been done in Goerlandt and
Montewka (2015); Montewka et al (2014) and Nordstrm et al (2016), but is a
model-based framework for assessing maritime-cyber risks. The aim of MaCRA
is also not to assess the flaws or risks of a specific system, as several previous
studies have already found various, isolated, technical vulnerabilities. Balduzzi
(2014); CyberKeel (2014a); Latin America & Caribbean (2014); Mordechai
et al (2014); Schmidt et al (2016); Trend news agency (2012); Wagstaff (2014)
and Suh (2014) have previously found that it is possible to jam or spoof GNSS,
modify ship details, create ghost vessels, trigger false alerts, and modify signal
transmission frequencies based on focused analyses.
Other recent studies focused on individual systems, not “systems of system
systems”, particularly navigation, represent the bulk of today’s maritime-cyber
research. For example, incorrect or corrupted digital charts within the ECDIS
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navigation system have been linked to the groundings of the USS Guardian,
CLS Thames, OVIT and other ships by the Marine accident investigation
branch (2012, 2014); Wagstaff (2014) and Vandenborn and Bell (2015). Addi-
tional studies have shown that navigational systems, and VDR data recorders,
can be intentionally exploited using software-based cyber-attacks via the Inter-
net, USB, CD, and DVD (CyberKeel (2014b); Dyryavyy (2014); Santamarta
(2015)). Several of these studies overlap with other areas of concern, such as
navigation in airplanes or cars (Bordonali et al (2017); Control (2015); Snyder
et al (2015); Yeomans (2014)), and the SCADA systems of smart grids and
railways (Collins (2017); Leyden (2016); Safa et al (2016)).
However, just as risk assessments for aeronautical and land-based vehi-
cles differ due to variations in system designs and environment, any evolving
cyber-risk model for maritime must also adapt to its unique factors. While
past maritime-based studies like Lane et al (2010) consider risk, they only
analyze it for one particular factor, as opposed to evaluating an entire ship
or fleet, as MaCRA aims to do. For example, Committee and Harwood (2015);
Danish Defence Intelligence Sevice’s Center for Cyber Security (2014) focused
on attacker assessments and Bateman (2010); Nankivell et al (2017) assessed
specific geographical regions where cyber-crimes are prevalent.
Other specialized risk assessment methods, frameworks, and standards
have long been used for companies, technologies, traffic, management (e.g.,
ISO), heath care (e.g., SEISMED), safety, and more (see den Braber et al
(2007); Cherdantseva et al (2016); Lund et al (2010); NIST (2012); Sommes-
tad et al (2013)). Based on this, there is no well established maritime risk
assessment framework covering cyber, and so the MaCRA model would be the
first specialized cyber-risk assessment tool for any and all maritime systems,
ships, and fleets. However, it is possible to interface established methods with
MaCRA. For example, MaCRA can incorporate more detailed insider-threat mod-
els, such as Cappelli et al (2012); CERT Insider Threat Center (2014).
Like some previous tools, e.g. Lund et al (2010), MaCRA primarily present
data visually. Studies have found this a more intuitive and effective way to
evaluate risks, Labunets et al (2014); St̊alhane and Sindre (2014), which is
why MaCRA provides risk zones and quadrants (i.e., riskz and riskq) for a
better human experience. However, quantified values are also available as risk
measurements (i.e., riskd). Thus MaCRA is able to produce results for different
users, e.g. operators, insurers, and mariners, seeking different assessments.
Currently MaCRA is unable to determine accurate cyber-maritime risks for
accidents, including accidentally lowered EoE or increased reward, and while
the model data can be altered after the incident, it cannot be modeled be-
forehand. This includes situations where an attacker accidentally discovers a
weakness, or acquires seemingly low-value data that is later revealed to have
a significantly higher value. Another limitation in this study is the amount of
available data on maritime systems, which shall be addressed in future work.
This is the first proposal for a framework designed specifically to assess
changin maritime-cyber risks, from single systems to multiple ships. It is simi-
lar but unlike research for automotive and aeronautical, as MaCRA accounts for
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relevant mobility, environmental and legislative factors in the maritime space,
as described in Section 2, and considers the entire ecosystem unlike research
focused on singular technical systems. This approach can be used comple-
mentary to existing maritime risk assessments, as discussed in the following
section, but is unique in its ability to identify cyber-risks and project useful
views for informed human security decisions.
6 Future Work
This article analyzed the maritime sector and, to better understand cyber-
threats of the global fleet, developed a comprehensive framework for assessing
risk, and illustrated its use with scenarios and projected views. In the future,
MaCRA will be suitably populated for real-world usage, as it was in Tam and
Jones (2018a) for assessing cyber-risks specific autonomous ships.
There are many vulnerable systems in the maritime sector and while they
have primarily resulted in accidents, these vulnerabilities may be intentionally
exploited with cyber-attacks. This paper has enumerated a large set of such
vulnerabilities and outcomes in Sections 3 and 4. Unfortunately, a complete
list of maritime systems and their cyber-vulnerabilities does not yet exist.
Additional collaboration with the maritime community will be needed to ob-
tain a fuller set of real-world data to enhance the MaCRA model. Future work
can then model existing vessels and fleets to understand the full use-cases
and abilities in global situations. To increase the framework’s usability, fu-
ture software-based tools shall be developed based on the MaCRA model for
more widespread usage. Once a better understanding of the current state of
maritime-cyber is achieved, i.e. what are the significant maritime cyber-risks,
future work shall develop more fine-grained risks assessments for specialized
areas and better security tools and policies. Furthermore, necessary amend-
ments will be made to maritime training and policies to improve awareness
and cyber-defenses. Fully understanding maritime-cyber risks would be able to
inform policy-making changes and additions holistically. An early demonstra-
tion of this can be found in Tam and Jones (2018b), however as risk becomes
better understood future policy work can be much more detailed and effective.
As there are overlaps with other risk assessment models for attackers,
SCADA, and more, as MaCRA is developed into software it may useful to in-
terface it with previously defined risk models. This may be particularly useful
in areas not effected by differences in the maritime environment and economy.
For example models on attacker profiles or hacker mentality, such as Cappelli
et al (2012); CERT Insider Threat Center (2014); Rios Insua et al (2016),
may be integrated if they prove to be detailed enough to define maritime-
specific attackers such as pirates using purely cyber-based attacks or hybrid
cyber-physical attacks. Similarly, previous work on modeling cyber-risks for
SCADA, which as previously mentioned is used in smart grids, water plants
etc., and satellite, which is used for smartphones and many other systems for
communication, may also be adaptable or integrable with the MaCRA model.
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Further developments to the MaCRA framework and a more complete set
of real-world data will help determine both common and high-level risks in
the maritime sector. These risks and their associated vulnerabilities can then
be addressed in future research. This may measurably lower cyber-risks for
a significant percentage of ships within the global fleet, or measurably lower
one entity’s risk by mitigating its most significant, high-level risk. Ideally,
further research will also anticipate future systems, particularly pertaining to
automated ships and ports, including analysis of traditionally on-shore systems
being adapted to ships, and specialized maritime systems. The internet of
things (IoT) will also play a large part in the future of shipping. It is intended
that over hundreds of million shipping containers and ships will be a part
of the IoT, as stated in International Chamber of Shipping (2016), and if it
were to be fully achieved, they will represent a large portion of such connected
devices. Thus it is essential to consider the risks of future developments.
7 Conclusions
This paper proposes a maritime cyber-risk assessment (MaCRA) framework to be
used by companies, organizations, and individuals to assess cyber-risks given
any possible maritime-cyber scenario, i.e. any combination of ship, system, en-
vironment, and attacker, in the unique maritime context. More importantly,
by fully populating the proposed model with real-world data and creating
an array of, human-friendly, customizable views, one can discover risks not
previously considered. The framework can also adapt as maritime technology
evolves and as attackers find new vulnerabilities and incentives. This is not
currently feasible when only assessing one attacker or system at a time, which
is the approach of most previous research. Moreover, similar cyber-risk as-
sessment frameworks are not well suited to the unique maritime environment.
This led to the development of MaCRA, to provide accurate and quantifiable
cyber-risk assessments, enabling the maritime community to identify the most
significant maritime-cyber risks with enough detail to strategically lower those
risks and continuously improve the global fleet’s cyber-security, i.e. understand
the trade-offs of applying or developing security solutions to optimally mitigate
identified risks. Understanding these assessments and trade-offs will increase
crew safety, general cyber-security, enable significant cost savings on cyber
protection investment, and inform accurate assessments for maritime crew,
businesses, cyber-risk insurers, policy makers, and researchers by constructing
different projections of the same underlying data to contextualize the risk in
a way appropriate to the multiplicity of target audiences in this sector.
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